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(Resumen) 
Pese al tiempo transcurrido, Democracy in America de Alexis de Tocqueville 
continúa siendo una obra fundamental para entender cómo los europeos ven y entienden a 
los Estados Unidos. La aproximación de Tocqueville se entiende, desde nuestra visión de 
finales del siglo XX, como una obra eminentemente sociológica y no exclusivamente 
política. Será desde esta perspectiva a partir de la cual se aproximen a la realidad 
norteamericana autores contemporáneos como Baudrillard, Simone de Beauvoir o Micel 
Crozier. 
Whom the gods would destroy, they first tantalize with the illusion that a visit to 
the United States entitles an author to describe so vast and various a nation, so complicated 
and diverse a set of social arrangements, so unprecedented an experiment in 
self-govemment. Yet French intellectuals in particular have converted their curiosity about 
American society into compelling visions of a future that has suddenly become actualized. 
For them it has been a matter of time. Such authors have a special fix on a society that is 
not fixed at all. Alexis de Tocqueville's account of seeing more than the United States—but 
also the fate of France—remains the most admired and has not been superseded as a 
comprehensively interesting study of life in the United States. Though bereft of indebtedness 
to Democracy in America, Jean Baudrillard's far less ambitious America is the best-known 
recent attempt to make sense of this country in terms of the short-circuiting of history itself. 
Whether it be the modemization so cogently analyzed in 1835 and 1840 OT the 
post-modemism that is situated in a dislocated lócale on these shores, such authors are 
legatees of the Marquis de Condorcet, the Marquis de Lafayette, and the "ideologues," all 
of whom saw through an American present into the French future. What characterizes key 
French writers—or French-bom Americans—is their flair for blending reportage and 
prophecy, present and future, in envisioning an accelerated destiny in the United States.' 
Travellers usually depend, like Tennessee Williams's Blanche DuBois, on the 
kindness of strangers; and those who summarize what they have leamed from their trips may 
be even more dependent on the indulgence of those strangers who are historíans, who must 
make allowances for the brevity of visits, the impediments ofcommunicatión, the atypicality 
of encounters, misleading impressions and inevitable biases. With Tocqueville, no such 
1. See Jardin, Alexis de Tocqueville: 1805-1859 101-2, and Tocqueville: A Biography 104; 
Sorman 264-65; Remond II, 514-18. 
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allowances or excuses are needed, however, even though, when he disembarked in New 
York in 1831, he was a stripling—only twenty-five years oíd, a minor official whotn the July 
Monarchy had recently demoled. His English was not fully adequate, ñor was his native 
tongue much understood by the occupants of the tavems and boarding houses where he and 
Gustave de Beaumont (himself a distant cousin of Lafayette) stayed. The visit was a trifle, 
lasting less than nine months, enough for a good initial impression. And once was enough. 
He never went back to the United States, a country about which at least twelve hundred of 
his compatriots had already written by 1835, including his own únele Chateaubriand in his 
influential Voyage dAmérique in 1827. Produced with the aid of two research assistants in 
Paris but without many authoritative sources, Democracy in America was written under 
circumstances so unpromising that lexicographers should list it to illustrate the familiar term 
chutzpah} 
Although the two visitors had ostensibly come to study the penal system for their 
govemment, Tocqueville retumed home inspired to créate "a new science of politics" that 
would make intelligible not only the United States but democracy itself. The completed 
study was enthusiastically reviewed in his homeland and in England (by John Stuart Mili), 
as well as in the host country. In fact, Democracy in America helped to establish a new 
discipline called sociology—the systematic attempt to describe society as a unit and to 
discem its laws of cohesión and development. Despite his later books as well as govenunent 
service, Tocqueville's reputation went into eclipse after his death in 1859; and in the United 
States the examination of its political culture which made him famous soon went out of 
print. 
Resurrection came late. By the end of the 1930s, the auguries of a tyranny lurking 
within democracy itself, of the extinction of political liberty in mass society, showed eerie 
foresight, since the dictatorships of Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin all claimed to be creatures 
of popular sovereignty and not merely the expressions of brutal power. In 1938 Democracy 
in America was rescued from neglect when Yale historian George W. Pierson retraced the 
steps of Tocqueville and Beaumont in America; and seven years later Alfred A. Knopf 
reprinted the masterpiece itself. Hailed during his own lifetime as the heir to Montesquieu, 
Tocqueville should by now be favorably compared to Marx, who is far less our 
contempera ry, more the wayward preacher of a visionary but voodoo economics whose 
system has been largely reduced to rubble. The major bequest of Tocqueville, who founded 
no school and left no disciples, is instead a blazing and undeceived astuteness. 
In the 1950s, when the touted American Century was at its apogee, Tocqueville's 
appeal to resist uiunodulated popular pressures excited the liberal imagination. His concern 
for the sort of intellectual independence that public opinión tends to endanger xppcastá to 
have foreseen the blacklists, the loyalty oaths, and other demands for orthodoxy in the 
period. His astonishment at the commercial proclivities of the Americans, poised to seize 
upon every social occasion to cióse a deal, resonated in the unprecedented affluence of the 
2. See Higonnet 54; Duroselle, La France et les Etats-Unis: Des origines á nosjours 67-68, 
and France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present 62. 
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postwar economy. The young magistrate's claim that in the United States every political 
issue is channeled into the courts has often been quoted in this ever more Htigious society, 
and his discovery that attomeys serve as our aristocratic class became a staple of bar 
association oratory. The Cold War also confirmed his remarkable prediction that the United 
States and Russia would emerge as the two supcrpowers of the planet. 
Without having conversed at length with a single black, Tocqueville was also 
amazingly prescient when he cautioned that the greatest threat to the intemal stability of the 
Union carne from the race question. He thus anticipated the social and moral issue that 
would ignite the Civil War. His sensitivities may have been heightened because his visit 
coincided with the execution of the rebellious Nat Tumer in Virginia. Writing at a time 
when the institution of slavery seemed firmly in place, when the female half of the 
population was disenfranchised, when the very ideal of equal treatment under law was a 
cruel mockery to millions of others as well, Tocqueville was nevertheless audacious enough 
to assert that equality was the axial principie on which everything in the nation pivoted. His 
thesis became especially relevant once the Fourteenth Amendment was taken more seriously, 
after 1954.' 
Indeed this single visit yielded so many perceptions and anticipated so much history 
that it seems churlish—but essential—to point out Tocqueville's mistakes and oversights. Yet 
he plainly did not understand the role technology would play in the making of the modem 
economy, falsely surmising that it would be mercantile rather than industrial; the United 
States did not become a nation of shopkeepers. In the clearing of the wildemess and the 
conquest of the West, he did not foresee the growth of cities. Corning from a country with 
a reputation for a lousy govemment but excellent administration, Tocqueville was fascinated 
by federalism; but in the shadow of the intense conflict between legitimists and Jacobins in 
France, he failed to grasp the importance of the two-party system in the United States. Ñor 
did he appreciate the specifically English heritage of its political institutions. In the Age of 
Jackson, Tocqueville barely mentioned the President of the United States (who 
underwhelmed the French pair callin on him in the White House). Tliis neglect is only fair, 
because The Age of Jackson (1945) refers orüy glancingly to Tocqueville, whose classic was 
still out of print when Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s Pulitzer Prize-winning study was written. 
The are of Schlesinger's own scholarship has highlighted the historical significance of the 
office that Tocqueville minimized.* 
Because fish and vegetables were served to diners before the meat, and oysters for 
dessert even in New York, Tocqueville was moved to denounce such "complete barbarism." 
Institutions of leaming in the United States were also largely ignored. He did not visit a 
single college and wrote almost nothing about schools, which so many nineteenth century 
citizens valued and which, in the twentieth century, have often become test sites for issues 
of race, equality and federalism. Had Tocqueville done nothing else other than introduce the 
term "individualism" into the American vocabulary (though he did not coin the term), he 
3. Jzrám, Alexis de Tocqueville 155-56, and Tocqueville 161. 
4. iarám, Alexis de Tocqueville 112-13, and Tocqueville 115-16; Pierson 420. 
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could have taken the rest of the aftemoon off. But he failed to see how individualism 
checked the nation's egalitarian impulses, how the imperatives of self-interest and 
self-advancetnent have frustrated the search for community, how industrialization promoted 
stiatiñcation. Certainly Httle lemains apt in the 1831 letter that he sent home from "the 
United States, [where] people have neither wars, ñor plagues, ñor literature, ñor eloquence, 
ñor fine arts, few great crimes, nothing of what rouses Europe's attention; here people enjoy 
the most pallid happiness that one can imagine."' 
Yet it is impossible to agree with Patrice Higonnet that "on balance . . . Democracy 
in America is not really a very good guide to the social and political structure of the United 
States in the early nineteenth century, or indeed in the nineteenth century generally." 
Tocqueville's "deficiency as a social scientist" meant that "he did not really understand the 
structure of American society," though Professor Higonnet oddly concedes that "both 
foreigners and Americans themselves have had reason to interpret the new nation more 
through the prísm of his work than through that of any other writer." From the glimpse of 
a district attomey shaldng hands with a prisoner, this "notable" caught the implications of 
democracy's triumph and revealed how travel broadens. The United States, he told Mili, was 
only the irame of his study; its true subject was the levelling of ranks and distinctions as a 
new principie of social order. (That "de" in his súmame was so adhesive that he just couldn't 
leave home without it.) Too fearful of the democratic prospect to be enchanted with the 
United States, he was wise enough to know that equality could not be stopped. It could only 
be regulated and restrained. Too sober to see the young nation as having reopened the gates 
of paradise, he avoided the delusions of utopians like Etienne Cabet ("AUons en Icarie!") and 
other contemporaries who fantasized about the site where a new stage of humanity would 
be launched. Conceived in a spectacular burst of intelligence, Democracy in America 
elucidated the meaning of modemization, and offered a theory in political sociology based 
on one test case: a large republic* 
Almost exactly a century later, the term "modemization" had joined its cognate 
"modemism" as an entree into contemporary experience (and as an indispensable password 
into the republicof letters). Among the most formidable gatekeepers has been Jacques 
Barzun, who was bom in París in 1907 and came to the United States at the age of thirteen, 
festooned "in rídiculous short pants and ignorant of baseball." A third of a century later, that 
land was "to all appearances as remote and irrecoverable as the America that Dickens (or 
Columbus) discoverd." A lifetime here nevertheless spurred Barzun to pose the sort of 
question that echoes the theme of Democracy in America: "b it possible that modem 
5. Quoted in Higonnet 55; Alexis de Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique II, 125-
27 or Democracy in America II, 104-6; Schleifer 244; Alexis de Tocqueville to Madame 
la Comtesse de Grancey (10 October 1831), quoted in Schleifer 43; Drescher 53-54, 
256, 273. 
6. Higonnet 61; Meyers 33-56; Bradley; Remond 58-63. 
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civilizatíon is something new, incommensurable with the oíd, just like the character of the 
American adventure itself?" 
And the answers were reverberant as well. GocTs Country and Mine insists upon a certain 
classlessness, or tather a melting of virtually everyone into a vague middle class, in a nation 
that the author regarded with the possessiveness he was willing to share with the Almighty: 
"What happened here on this enormous expanse of itact wildness is that manldnd got out 
from under and spread out. From under what? From under the lid—everybody, from under 
all the lids—kings, churches, aristocracies, landlords, the military caste, the burgher class, 
the lawyers, the lesser nobility, the petty bourgeoisie—the piles of subclasses on top of 
subclasses that formed the structure of oíd Europe. They left an oíd world to stretch their 
limbs and spread out fíat, with only the sky above them. When the Eastem end thickened 
into layers for a new social pyramid, the under-layers slid out again to the West," since "this 
country was peopled by underdogs, refugees, nobodies, and . . . it keeps on being run by 
them." Perhaps only a naturalized citizen would see such levelling as anything but natural 
(Barzun 8-9, 25, 26). 
Though Barzun is, like Tocqueville, only .partly an Americanist, his work 
intríguingly links the modernization decoded in Democracy in America and the 
post-modemism that has become fashionable in the academy. Even the contrast that 
Tocqueville formulated between aristocratic literature and democratic literature roughly 
corresponds to the distinctions between classicism and romanticism which Barzun made 
central to his work in cultural history; and both writers felt obliged to champion the virtues 
of the latter. The 1961 revisión of Romanticism and the Modern Ego (1943) also observes 
that ""Modemism' is just beginning to acquire the tone of the past. The ñame itself grows 
empty for us, though it is fuU of recognized and cherishable associations." By mid-century 
such sensibility and such art seemed exhausted. Especially among modem(ist) poets runs 
"the paralyzing thought that everything has been done," the burden of too much history. 
Thus "debunking [is] used to destroy admiration. No doubt, to admire what is false may 
corrupt judgment, but to admire nothing at all, for fear of being duped, is a progressive 
disease of the spirit." Barzun ever scomed the comic: "The damaged will accounts for the 
peculiar and obligatory sense of humor of our time, the defensive laugh coupled with every 
action, to forestall derision by someone else or one's later self." Yet notice how easily 
Tocqueville's mordant account of majoritarian tyranny sudes into Barzun's anatomy of "the 
modern ego" itself, how Tocqueville's typical citizen had become typecast into the 
diamaturgy of advanced art: "The modern ego is more concemed with the way it appears 
in others' eyes than with leaming fully about itself and admiiting its troubles fearlessly."' 
In more recent accounts, however, the influence of Democracy in America has 
become less emphatic and more problema tic. It scarcely registers in Simone de Beauvoir's 
L'Amérique au Jour le Jour, a joumal based on a four months' visit in 1947. Despite the 
7. Jardín, Alexis de Tocqueville 256-57, and Tocqueville 258-59; Barzun, Classic, Romantic 
and Modern 115n, 117, 121, 122, 123, 131. 
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onset of the Red Scare and the conformism that suppressed a sense of autonomy, de 
Beauvoir tnanaged to discover freedom of thought, "a tradition of self-criticism in America, 
such as we (xice had in France." Though she later changed her mind under the impact of the 
Cold War and denounced political confoimity, her joumal barely acknowledged any thteat 
firom the tyranny of the majority. She was impressed instead by those intellectuals whose 
assaults on "a cenain standard of moraUty, politics and the economy . . . are symbols of 
their love for their country." Modemization has effectuated the death of the past, which 
Americans may respect—"but only insofar as it is a thing embalmed; the idea of the living 
past, integrated with the present, is foreign to them." Unlike Tocqueville, she encountered 
serious writers and artists; and de Beauvoir had another advantage over him in the minority 
perspective that she adopted. Her cicerones included the novelist Richard Wright, to 
whom—along with his wife—the book is dedicated; and the condition of cffdinary American 
women was a revelation that helped to inspire Tlie Second Sex, published in France in 1949. 
The dynamism and vigor of this society compelled de Beauvoir to conclude, almost as a non 
sequilar, that how it operates matters, and not just for France or for Europe. "America is a 
pivotal point in the world where the future of man is at stake," she asserted. "To üke 
America or not to Uke her: these words have no sense." Her host country was therefOTe not 
just a lócale; it was a symptom.' 
This postwar ambivalence was not shared by the social scientist Michel Crozier, 
who recalled falling "in love with America at an early age," primarily "because I was struck 
by the sharp contrast between the freedom that has reigned there from the beginning and the 
stifling French bureaucracy to which I have devoted a large part of my research." His first 
visit occurred in 1946, a year before de Beauvoir's, when the self-described "pro-American 
leftist" was exaaly Tocqueville's age. But written in the aftermath of a teaching stint at 
Harvard in 1980, The Trouble with America confronted the wounded civilization that the 
United States had become in the period from the Kennedy assassination through the Teherán 
hostage crisis. Crozier's volume is saturated with a gloominess foreign to Tocqueville, who 
eams only three brief references. Indeed "the rage for equality that worried Tocqueville a 
hundred and fifty years ago has progressively weakened the social fabric," Crozier observed, 
"to the point where the marvelous American capacity for association, which he once found 
so admirable, has been drained of its vitalizing power. The United States today is no longer 
the America Tocqueville described. Its votuntary associations have ceased to be a mainstay 
of a democracy constantly on the move but are now simply a means of self-defense for 
various interests . . . This breakdown of conmiunity structures is what has made America 
a country full of anxiety." 
Crozier pinned much of the blame for the malaise on attomeys, as though the 
quondam quasi-aristocracy had run amuck, because the United States is "undoubtedly the 
8. Beauvoir, L'Amérique aujour lejour 264, 369-70, 372, 376, or America Doy by Doy 209, 
291, 293, 295-%; idem.. La Forcé des chases 137-39, or Forcé of Circumstance 123-24; 
Granjon 148-49, 152, 162; Bair 339-40. 
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country where that passion for law has been pressed . . . to the edge of madness." (70% of 
the world's attomeys practice in the United States.) In another sense Crozier vindicated his 
predecessor's faith that the Aitierican experience was extremely relevant as a prefiguration 
of the European fate of drift and confusión, a faith that also animated Georges Duhamel's 
hostile best-seller about the United States, based on a six weeks' visit in 1928. Using the 
phrase le mal américain, Duhamers Scénes de la vie future denounced a materialist 
"ant-heap" of a civilization that had already subjugated much of the "dazzled" European soul. 
Crozier himself concluded that "two contradictory statements are equally valid and central 
for understanding the American crisis. America's plight is not hers alone, it is the common 
plight of all post-industrial Western societies . . . America nevertheless is stilla very special 
case because its rigidities are of a different nature, because its commitment to the dominant 
mode of rationality remains deeper and stronger than that of other post-industrial countries, 
and, finally, because its sheer size and power impose specific constraints [that] it cannot 
discard.'" 
Perhaps the most vigorous and engaging rebuttal, however, came indirectly from 
Sanche de Gramont, who decided to go native so fiílly that he rearranged his súmame as 
Ted Morgan. His 1978 memoir and miscellany harkens back not otJy to Tocqueville but to 
J. Héctor St. John de Crévecoeur, though Morgan is certainly no Mister Heartbreak (as John 
Berryman translated the ñame in Dream Songs #5). Indeed On Becoming American might 
have been entided Letters ofan American Affirmer, in which immigration is itself the best 
validation for the national experiment: "This country is a success, in the same way that a 
Broadway show is a success. People are lined up at the box office for tickets of admission." 
Having studied at the Sorbonne in the 1950s, Morgan realized that "Americans are the true 
existentialists. An American is the sum of his undertakings. . . . He makes himself and is 
responsible for himself. He can't blame bloodlines or bad breaks. Americans are given 
enough elbow room to succeed or go bust. They are left on their own, to triumph or 
cultívate their self-disgust. Our casualties are not due to regimentation," he added. "They are 
the casualties of freedom, the j)eople who have O. D.'d on cholees. Anybody can try 
anything—after all, it's his funeral. Every American is given by birthright enough rope to 
hang himself." Here the stress is on a rambunctious but rather punitive freedom of 
opportunity, not the benign equality of conditions that Democracy in America had 
undetscored almost a century and a half earlier. 
Consider the contrast with France, "an oíd country with a long history. It had lived 
through epic periods. It knew its final shape," he acknowledged. But the United States "was 
a young country, still taking risks, still bubbling. I wanted to Uve in a country that was still 
having growing pains. . . . I wanted a creed based on the promise of growth rather than the 
measuring of limits. . . . I wanted a society still able to believe, in spite of the coundess 
9. Crozier, Le mal américain 7-8, 207, 238, 288-89, or Tlie Trouble with America x, 85, 
106, 142; "Do We Have Too Many Lawyers?" 54; Duhamel, Scénes de la vie future 110, 
244-46, or America the Menace: Scénes from the Life of the Future 214-15; Ory 65-66. 
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times that belief has been vitiated, that if you worked hard and did the ríght thing you would 
attain your goals. . . ." Morgan asserted that "in oíd societies, people knew who they were, 
they were given cards of identity at birth, and they were expected to remain in their allotted 
ccHnpartments. In a new society, people asked themselves who they were and what they 
might become. It was a matter of finding one's natural place rather than an assigned place" 
(Morgan 4, 66, 72. 101). 
On Becoming American records the author's ancestry, stemming from distant 
Gascón roots in the eleventh century. But to become an American meant erasing that "de"; 
and in applying for naturalization in 1973, Morgan was asked to renounce his title of count. 
"Gladly." "Tell me, what does it get you?" the official asked. "A córner table at the 
Grenouille," was the reply. Apart from answering some other questions, he had little else 
to do other than pay a $25 fee—"the bargain of the century." So canny and amusing are his 
observations that his adopted country got a pretty good deal too. "In Europe," Morgan 
asserted, "you can be rude to . . . [the lower classes] because you can be sure they will 
never extricate themselves from the mire. They will remain what they are, the objects of 
your snub. In America there are so many surprising reversáis that it makes sense to be nice 
to people. . . . The office boy may someday be board chairman. . . . Whoever you kick on 
the ladder on your way up is going to kick you back when he reaches your rung. In Europe 
there isn't even a ladder," an overstatement that ignores comparable rates of upward mobility 
in advanced industrial nations. 
The citizenship that Morgan achieved in 1977 nevertheless closes the circle of 
identity that Crévecoeur first traced. Both were French army veterans who married 
Americans and wrote in English; neither suffered from the handicap of having known 
America otJy as a traveller or a tourbt; and it is fitting that, while the eighteenth century 
farmer lived primarily in New York state, the twentieth century joumalist moved with his 
family westward to California. Ctévecoeur's resonant Letter III describes the American as 
a hybrid composed of many ethnic and racial strains (though not Afrícan); acculturation in 
a new envir(»mient is central to his thesis. Morgan likewise celebrated the mixed makeup 
of the population rather than its Anglo-Saxon core. Tabulating the 41% of American Nobel 
laureates who were bom abroad, he speculated that "our mongrelization keeps us ahead.""* 
Unlike Gozier, Morgan was impressed by the eagerness with which the local 
inhabitants stiU join voluntary associations. "Whenever two or more Americans have a 
common problem, they form a Committee of Concemed Citizens," leading him to "wonder 
if there is a single American who does not belong to some association . . . I once thought 
I had found one, a hermit who lived in an abandoned silver mine in the wildemess área of 
Idaho's SalmcHi River. But he told me he belonged to the National Association of Hermits." 
Unlike Tocqueville, whose depth charges detected a centrifugal stability amid all the buzzing 
energy, On Becoming American has recorded "puré process; it is an open-ended system . . 
. We are a people in transit, propelled by the hi-test fuel of innovation." Whereas 
10. Morgan 183, 185, 191, 228-29; Slotkin 259-67; Grabo 159-72. 
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Democracy in America uses the single key of egalitarianism to unlock the national 
mysteries, Morgan has appreciated the contradictions, the paradoxes, the absurdities, with 
no single forcé at work—not even the historical destiny that France itself might eventually 
share. He pushed to the limits the doctrine of American exceptionalism, classifying his new 
country as "an accumulation of peculiarities," because "rarely does a day go by without my 
seeing or hearing something that strikes me as peculiar to these shores, and I shake my head 
and say 'Only in America.' Americans fail to realize that to the rest of the world they are 
as strange as creatures from another planet" (Morgan 226, 291-92, 310-11, 319). 
Which brings us to Baudrillard, whose account of TAméñque sidérale, at "astral 
America," was spun from a lecttire tour, a set of postcards from the cutting-edge of 
post-modemism. In 1986 the University of Nanterre sociologist arrived to contémplate the 
land that contained Disneyland, which "is there to conceal the fact that it is the 'real' 
country, all of 'real' America, which is Disneyland." That amusement park "is presented as 
imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real." But it isn't; "Los Angeles and 
the America surrounding it is no longer real, but of' the order of the hyperreal and of 
simulation." According to Baudrillard, it is a land of signs within signs and without 
referents, of media but scarcely of politics, of a network of "simulacra" but not of the sinews 
of power, of a present without a past and of a future that entices the rest of the Western 
world too. It is a nation surfeited with advettisements and sensations yet barren of meaning. 
Tocqueville had toured the United States by stagecoach and steamboat. The best way to pin 
America to the mat, Barzun had proposed, is from an early moming train. Baudrillard 
sweats by the automobile. Drive, he said, because "that way you leam more about this 
society than all academia could ever tell you. . . . Drive ten thousand miles across America 
and you will know more about the country than all the institutes of sociology and political 
science put together."" 
Whatever the state of Baudrillard's radiator, it must be noted that his theories hold 
little water, in part because of fmding himself "here in my imagination," he admits, "long 
before I actually came here." Tocqueville had approached the United States deductively, to 
illustrate a hypothesis; but Baudrillard's America is abstract, bizarre, superfícial and 
exasperating. The problem cannot simply be ascribed to jet-lag; it is due to method. 
Tocqueville had fathomed the polity of a foreign land by interviewmg Oíd Hickory, John 
Quincy Adams, Sam Houston and Daniel Webster, plus Cabinet officers. But in TAmérique 
sidérale only a handful of ñames are sprinkled, like star-dust: painter Jim Diñe, the late Walt 
Disney, the late F. Scott Fitzgerald, the late Jimi Hendrix, Michael Jackson, Charles 
Manson, Roña Id Reagan, astronomer Cari Sagan and Andy Warhol, none of whom the 
touring sociologist got out of the car to meet. Encounters with actual Americans were 
apparently uninteresting, perhaps because such citizens "will confíim your analysis by facts, 
statistics or lived experience, thereby divesting it of all conceptual valué." 
11. Baudrillard, Amérique 16, 55, 109 or America 5, 27, 54-55; idem., Simulacres et 
simulation 25-26, OT Simulations 25; Barzun, Gocts Country and Mine 3. 
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So iiresponsible are the author's ovetstatements that his book invites the suspicion 
that he is trying to pulí the reader's leg. No one ever smiles at anyone else in New York 
City, where the number of single diners ("the saddest sight in the world") amazes him, as 
though no one ever ate alone in París. Anyone who carnes cash in the United States is 
cotisidered mad. Los Angeles lacks elevatois. The stench of death pervades Santa Barbara 
(which is arguably the tnost charming of American communities). Baudrillard implies that 
the West was settled by the Puritans; and, staring out from a Twin Cities hotel room, he 
muses on what has happened to "the utopian dream of a helienistic city on the edge of the 
Rockies? Minneapolis, Miimeapolis!"—oblivious to the fact that the city is located a 
thousand miles east of "the edge of the Rockies." Indeed the cartography of Baudríllard's 
Ameríca is about as distoited as the provincial Manhattanite's (according to Saúl Steinberg's 
famous cover for the New Yorker): no South or Northwest, almost no New England or 
Midwest. It is a very small republic. Motmons are the only religious group mentiooed; the 
ethnic groups very bríefly cited are Hispanics, blacks and native Amerícans. "Right laoe 
must exit," a highway sign aimounces, leading the author to reflect: "This 'must exit* has 
always struck me as a sign of destiny. I have got to go, to . . . leave this providential 
highway which leads nowhere," except maybe to other freeways, the Safeways, the deserts 
and Disneyland—for "these are America, not the galleríes, churches, and culture." Either/or. 
No wonder then that to Baudrillard the American "genius" is expressed not only in the 
"irrepressible development of equality" but in "banality and indifference" as well." 
This America is not completely wacky, however. As one critic acknowledged after 
reading the work of Baudrillard's older brother, Marshall McLuhan, "it is impure nonsense, 
i. e., nonsense adulterated by sense." Tocqueville's Americans were bom equal; Morgan's 
are bom free; Baudríllard's are bom modem—a condition that will fotever elude the FreiKh, 
who are bewitched by "the nineteenth century bourgeois dream." His countrymen must 
undeistand that "Ameríca is the original versión of modemity. We are the dubbed or 
subtitled versión." He adds that "all the myths of modemity are American," without crediting 
Democracy in America itself for crystaliizing those myths; and the French aiKl other 
Europeans "will therefore never be modem in the proper sense of the term." Baudrillard is 
quite right to distinguish the late twentieth century from earlier eras by the influence of mass 
media, by how dominant images from televisión and movies have become, by the adoption 
of a show-business sensibility in public Ufe, by the promises of leisure and consumption far 
beyond earlier features of "the pursuit of happiness." In the United States such trends have 
been pushed further than elsewhere, because Americans "are themselves simulation in its 
most developed state . . . They are the ideal material for an analysis of all the possible 
variants of the modem world." But these changes hardly oblitérate the quotidian struggles 
of work and family and friendship, ñor erase the regional, class, ethnic and religious 
differences that are so noticeable and perhaps ineradicable. In his addiction to the 
12. BivuiáWaidy Amérique 22, 32, 33, 34-35, 61, 106-7, 122, 143, 174, 178, 208-9, 233, 244, 
or America 7-8, 13, 14, 15, 30, 38, 53, 61, 72, 87, 89, 104, 121, 125; Hughes 382. 
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"conceptual valué" of the post-modemist project, Baudrillard clumsily treats the subtleties 
and recalcitrant empirical evidence that social analysis must address. Tocqueville got religión 
wrong by speculating that Americans would tend to become either Román Catholics or 
pantheists; but through his windshield Baudnllard managed to see only silhouettes who 
"bowed and prayed / (t)o the neón God they made."" 
Such perspectives ignore much of the American experience, such as the wrenching 
and unjust consequences of industrialism that appalled Brítish visitois like Rudyard Kipling 
in Chicago ("I urgendy desire never to see it again") and Herbert Spencer in Pittsburgh ("Six 
months residence here would justify suicide"). The violence that has punctuated so much of 
the nation's past has also been largely neglected. What French visitors and the French-bom 
ha ve nevertheless noticed over the couise of a century and a half can suggest some 
continuities of American life; the omissions in such writings may also indirectly reveal as 
much about their own society as what they observed in the United States itself. One society 
can become a sort of anagram for another. Meditations on France arrive packaged as reports 
from the United States; "American" texts can be pretexts for discussing France. The flux of 
one social system seems to magnify the sense of rigidity in the other, the openness of one 
heightens the sense of constraint in the other; and the heterogeneity of the United States 
diverges from a nation slow to accept a droit á la différence or pluralism (qtd. in Heale 29, 
and in Livesay 126). 
Such contrasts suggest the longing to fulfíll elsewhere what is missing at home, 
which may explain why, since the mid-twentieth century, French public opinión polis ha ve 
consistently ranJced the United States as the most admired foreign nation (insofar as the 
French can summon admiration for any foreignens at all). In 1984, for example, pollsters 
discovered that the French were more pro-American than the British or the West Gennans. 
Though the Grand Larousse has listed as many as thirty-two French terms prefixed by "anti," 
none of these objects of hostility includes américanisme, which shows up by itself as early 
as 1866, defíned as a "manner of existence which imitates that of . . . the inhabitants of the 
United States." No wonder it is easy to detect anxieties about its current hegemony in the 
popular arts, typifíed by one embittered denunciation of Euro Disneyland in the spring of 
1992 as a "culttiral Chemobyl." Such animus reflects a national vulnerability and curiosity 
that deserve historical analysis. Tracing the influence of images of democracy in America 
enables scholars and other readers to get two for the price of one, which is the bonus of the 
comparative method.'* 
13. Macdonald 219; Baudrillard, Amérique 57-58, 146, 151-52, \61, at America 28-29, 73, 
76, 81; Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique II, 48-51, or Democracy in America ü , 
30-33; Paul Simón, "The Sound of Silence," qtd. in Goldstein 140. 
14. Duroselle, La France et les Etats-Unis 265, or France and the United States 251-52; 
Costigliola 190-98; Kaspi 291; Rezé 171-76; Lacome and Rupnik 37-38; Arianne 
Mnouchldne qtd. in Zuber 69. 
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